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Lying by Omission
Shaofei Jiang∗
This paper studies disclosure games with general disclosure rules. A sender ob-
serves a piece of evidence about an unknown state and tries to influence the posterior
belief of a receiver by disclosing evidence with possible omission. We characterize the
unique equilibrium value function of the sender given any disclosure rule. Applying
this characterization, we study left-censored disclosure, where evidence is a sequence of
signals, and the sender can truncate evidence from the left. In equilibrium, seemingly
sub-optimal messages are disclosed, and the sender’s disclosure contains the longest
truncation that yields the maximal difference between the number of favorable and
unfavorable signals. These findings are results of coordination among senders with
different evidence endowment.
Keywords: Disclosure games, Hard evidence, Communication
JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83
Seldom, very seldom does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; seldom
can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken; but
where, as in this case, though the conduct is mistaken, the feelings are not, it
may not be very material.
—Jane Austen, Emma
1. Introduction. Eliciting information from a biased party is challenging. Verifiability
of information alleviates the problem by eliminating lies from disclosure, but rarely can we
exclude omission or holdback of information. For example, a car dealer may emphasize the
fuel efficiency of a car but neglect the fact that it lacks certain safety features; a researcher
may draw conclusions using only the subsample of young adults; a job seeker may include
five years of employment history in resume but leave out earlier experiences. In each case,
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the disclosure bears true information about the subject of interest, but skepticism remains
due to possible omission of information.
Another observation from the above examples is that different ways of omitting informa-
tion are feasible in different contexts. The car dealer can omit any inferior aspects of the
car, while the researcher can only reasonably exclude observations based on the values of
certain observables. The job seeker can include work experiences in a most recent period but
usually cannot write a resume with gaps between jobs. How does the disclosure rule affect
information receiver’s skepticism and outcomes of communication?
In this paper, we study verifiable disclosure games, allowing for general disclosure rules.
A sender is endowed with a piece of hard evidence about an unknown state of the world
and tries to influence the posterior belief of a receiver by strategically disclosing evidence.
A disclosure rule describes all feasible ways of omitting information, i.e. for every possible
evidence endowment, a set of messages that the sender can disclose. The disclosure rule
is common knowledge, and the sender cannot commit to fully disclosing her evidence en-
dowment. Hence, the receiver is skeptical about the disclosed information and believes that
unfavorable information may be concealed.
Given any disclosure rule, we characterize the unique equilibrium value function of the
sender. Applying this general result, we study the following leading example of left-censored
disclosure.
1.1. Leading example. New hedge funds are often privately offered in incubation periods
before being publicly offerred. The main goal of incubation is to accumulate trading records–
when a hedge fund turns full fledged, the manager can disclose (part of) the trading record
from the incubation period to potential investors as hypothetical returns.
In this leading example, we consider the interaction between a hedge fund manager (the
sender) who has a trading record from an incubation trial and a representative investor (the
receiver). For simplicity, the hedge fund is either a success or a failure, and the trading record
is a dated sequence of binary signals–high or low–each indicates the return on a trading day
in the incubation period. If the hedge fund is a success, it has frequent high returns, whereas
in the case of a failure, it has high returns with lower frequency. The fund manager’s goal is
to persuade the investor that the new hedge fund is a success (i.e. to increase the investor’s
posterior belief that the hedge fund is a success) by selectively disclosing the trading record.
The disclosure rule in place permits left censoring. Since the investor does not know
the starting date of the incubation period (we assume that the ending date is commonly
known as the current date or when the public offering is filed), the manager can truncate
the trading record from the left and disclose a set of most recent signals. This may be
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profitable if the trading record contains relatively more low returns at the beginning of the
incubation period. From the investor’s perspective, the incubation period starts no later
than the earliest date reported but is unknown by how much earlier, and the investor cannot
distinguish a left-censored report from a trading record that is shorter to begin with. This
leads to the investor’s skepticism about the disclosed record.
1.2. Preview of results and related literature. We model disclosure rules as preorders on
a fixed evidence space. This representation of disclosure rules satisfies the standing assump-
tions in the literature of verifiable disclosure (e.g. Bull and Watson (2007), Ben-Porath and Lipman
(2012), and Hart et al. (2017)), but is more general in that the evidence space in our model
need not be finite. Given any disclosure rule, we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent
and characterize the unique value function of the sender. This characterization is similar to
that in Rappoport (2017), but our result uses a straightforward construction and applies to
games with countably infinite evidence space. The construction can be used to construct an
equilibrium from the equilibrium value function.
Using the general characterization result, we study a model of left-censored disclosure.
The equilibrium has the following features. First, there is no unravelling. That is, full
disclosure of the trading record is not an equilibrium. Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981),
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that when disclosure is credible, and the sender’s
bias is known to the receiver, all information is revealed. In the leading example, however,
the investor does not become fully informed about the trading record. The reason is in line
with the explanation by Dye (1985), Shin (1994, 2003), and Dziuda (2011): the receiver is
uncertain about how well informed the sender is, and the sender can pretend to possess less
evidence rather than less favorable evidence.
Second, initial low returns are disclosed in equilibrium. The manager’s equilibrium value
depends on the maximal difference between the number of high returns and the number of
low returns among all truncations of the trading record from the left. However, the manager
may reveal a longer truncation than the one that obtains this maximal difference. In terms
of face value, this longer truncation lower the manager’s payoff, but in equilibrium, the
investor is not influenced by the redundant unfavorable evidence at the beginning of the
report. This result is expalained as coordination between senders with different evidence
endowment. If all senders with trading records that have a same optimal truncation report
the same, the persuasiveness of this message becomes so undermined that senders with
some evidence endowment will find it optimal to report differently. Instead, senders report
different messages in equilibrium, including those seemingly sub-optimal ones, such that all
on-path messages yield a higher payoff than deviating.
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This explanation complements previous studies which explain similar observations. Dziuda
(2011) models a disclosure game with strategic and honest senders. The honest type always
reveals the evidence without omission, so her message is dicounted less by the receiver.
The strategic type therefore has an incentive to mimic the honest type by reporting some
seemingly unfavorable evidence. Guttman et al. (2014) study the dynamic disclosure of firm
performance, and show that due to dynamic considerations, later reports are interpreted as
more favorable although the timing of obtaining signals is independent of the firm’s value.
Our model does not have an honest type or dynamic considerations. It is also worth noting
here that in our model, the informativeness of each signal is the same, so the result does not
arise because the receiver values earlier signals less.
Third, when two truncations both yield the maximal difference between the number of
high and low returns, the equilibrium message always contains the longer truncation (it may
be even longer, as is explained above). This is not due to any intrinsic value of the length of
evidence. In fact, the length of trading record per se is uninformative about the quality of
the hedge fund in our model, and there is no tie-breaking rule that favors longer messages.
The result is again due to coordination between senders with different evidence endowment.
In equilibrium, senders with longer evidence endowment also report longer, so that senders
with shorter evidence endowment who cannot make longer reports pool on reporting shorter
truncations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our main model, and
Section 3 characterizes the unique value function of the sender. We present and solve a model
of the leading example in Section 4. The last section concludes. All proofs are relegated in
the appendix.
2. The Model. There are two stages. Two players, a sender (she) and a receiver (he),
move sequentially. At the outset of the game, a state of the world ω ∈ {G,B} is realized with
probability pi0 ∈ (0, 1) on ω = G. Neither player observes the realized state ω, and the prior
pi0 is common knowledge. In the first stage, the sender observes a piece of hard evidence,
denoted by e, about the realized state. She then reports a message m to the receiver. In the
second stage, the receiver observes the message and takes an action a.
2.1. Evidence. The evidence space E is exogenously given and contains finite or count-
ably many elements. Let FG and FB be two distributions supported on E (i.e. FG(e) > 0
and FB(e) > 0 for all e ∈ E). In the first stage, the sender observes a piece of evidence
e ∈ E, which is referred to as her evidence endowment. It is a random draw from either FG
or FB, depending on the relized state. If ω = G, e is drawn from distribution FG; if ω = B,
it is drawn from distribution FB.
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2.2. Messages and Disclosure Rules. After observing her evidence endowment e, the
sender reports a message m ∈ M(e) to the receiver, where M(e) denotes the set of feasible
messages given her evidence endowment e. Naturally, the collection of the sender’s feasible
messages {M(e)}e∈E descirbes the disclosure rule of the game. We consider a broad class of
disclosure rules satisfying the following standing assumptions:1,2
(A1) M(e) ⊂ E for all e ∈ E;
(A2) (Reflexivity) e ∈ M(e) for all e ∈ E;
(A3) (Transitivity) If e′ ∈M(e) and e′′ ∈M(e′), e′′ ∈ M(e);
(A4) For all sequences {en}∞n=1 in E such that M(e1) ⊃ M(e2) ⊃ . . ., there exists N ≥ 1
such that M(en) =M(eN ) for all n ≥ N .
One way to interpret these assumptions is to view evidence and messages as physical
documents (Bull and Watson, 2004). The sender is endowed with a set of documents and is
able to omit some documents and submit the remainder to the receiver. (A2) says that the
sender is always allowed to submit all documents without omission. (A3) says that if there
are two senders handling documents sequetially, both abiding by the disclosure rule, then any
omission that can be done by two senders can be done by just one sender under the disclosure
rule. (A4) says that even if there are infinitely many senders who can sequentially omit part
of the documents, the process of omission must stop in finite steps. One implication of (A4)
is that in any subset of the evidence space, there exists at least one minimal evidence to
which further omission of information is not possible.
Under (A1) through (A3), a disclosure rule can be equivalently defined as a preorder -
on E such that e′ - e if and only if e′ ∈ M(e).3 An equivalence of (A4) in terms of this
preorder is as follows.
(A4′) For all sequences {en}∞n=1 in E such that e1 % e2 % . . ., there exists N ≥ 1 such that
eN - en for all n ≥ N .
In the remainder of the paper, we shall abstract away the specific structure of the message
space, and refer to a disclosure rule simply by a preorder on the evidence space satisfying
1(A1) through (A3) are standard in the literature (see, for example, Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012)
and Hart et al. (2017)), and they are without loss of generality if normality is assumed (Bull and Watson,
2007). A disclosure rule {M(e)}e∈E satisfies normality if for every e ∈ E, there exists me ∈M(e) such that
me ∈ M(e′) ⇒ M(e) ⊂ M(e′) for all e′ ∈ E. That is, if a sender with evidence e can distinguish herself
from a sender with evidence e′ (using some message in M(e) but not in M(e′)), then she can do so using
a “maximal message” me. Hence, it is without loss of generality to consider only maximal messages, i.e.
{me}e∈E , which can be mapped onto from the evidence space E.
2(A4) is a technical assumption. It is automatically satisfied when the evidence space is finite. To the best
of my knowledge, no previous paper has studied disclosure games with countably infinite evidence spaces
where (A4) is violated.
3A preorder - is a binary relation satisfying reflexivity (e - e for all e) and transitivity (e′′ - e′ - e ⇒
e′′ - e).
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(A4′). Given a disclosure rule -, the sender who observes evidence e reports a message
m - e to the receiver.
2.3. The receiver’s action. In the second stage, the receiver observes the sender’s mes-
sage m and takes an action a ∈ R.
2.4. Payoffs. The receiver has quadratic loss utility function and maximizes his expected
payoff, i.e. uR(a, ω) = −(a− xω)2, where xG = 1 and xB = 0. The receiver’s optimal action
therefore is to choose action equal to his posterior belief on ω = G.
The sender’s payoff equals the receiver’s action, i.e. uS(a, ω) = a. That is, the sender
has an incentive to persuade the receiver that the state is good. Specifically, the sender’s
evidence endowment e and the realized state ω are payoff irrelevant to the sender.
2.5. Strategies. A (pure) strategy of the sender is s : E → E such that s(e) - e for all
e ∈ E. A mixed strategy of the sender is σ : E → ∆(E) such that supp(σ(·|e)) ⊂ LC(e)
for all e ∈ E, where LC(e) = {m : m - e} is the lower contour set of e with respect to the
disclosure rule.
A (pure) strategy of the receiver is a : E → R. A system of beliefs for the receiver is
µ : E → [0, 1], where µ(m) is the receiver’s posterior belief on ω = G after receiving message
m. Since the receiver’s problem admits a unique solution given any posterior belief, the
receiver never uses mixed strategies in equilibrium.
2.6. Equilibrium. A disclosure game may have multiple Nash equilibria, including some
trivial ones. For example, if the sender can always omit all evidence and report an empty
message, there exists a Nash equilibrium where the sender always reports this empty message
and the receiver chooses the prior regardless of the message. Following Hart et al. (2017),
we focus on truth-leaning equilibra.
A truth-leaning equilibrium (or simply, an equilibrium) is a collection of the sender’s
strategy, the receiver’s strategy, and the receiver’s system of beliefs (σ⋆, a⋆, µ), such that:
1. (Sender optimality) Given a⋆,
(1) supp(σ⋆(·|e)) ⊂ argmax
m-e
a⋆(m)
for all e ∈ E;
2. (Receiver optimality) Given µ,
(2) a⋆ = µ;
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3. (Bayesian consistency) Given σ⋆, the receier’s posterior belief at any on-path message
m ∈ ⋃
e∈E
supp(σ⋆(·|e)) is given by the Bayes’ rule
(3) µ(m) =
∑
e∈UC(m) σ
⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈UC(m) σ
⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)] ,
where UC(m) = {e : m - e} is the upper contour set of m;
4. (Truth-leaning) Given a⋆,
(4) e ∈ argmax
m-e
a⋆(m)⇒ σ⋆(e|e) = 1;
5. (Off-path beliefs) The receiver’s belief at any off-path message m is
(5) µ(m) =
FG(m)pi0
FG(m)pi0 + FB(m)(1− pi0) .
In other words, a truth-leaning equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that satisfies
the following additional conditions:
1. (Truth-leaning) The sender strictly prefers disclosing her evidence endowment e to
disclosing other messages if reporting e is optimal;
2. (Off-path beliefs) If an off-path message m is reported, the receiver believes that the
sender is disclosing her evidence endowment without omission, i.e. e = m.
Several remarks are in order regarding the equilibrium concept. First, truth-leaning
equilibria can be viewed as limit points of Nash equilibria in purturbed games where (i)
there is an infinitesimal probability that the sender’s evidence endowment is revealed to
the receiver regardless of what she chooses to disclose, and (ii) there is an infinitesimal
reward for revealing the evidence endowment. Second, a truth-leaning equilibrium is receiver
optimal and has the same outcome as in a mechanism where the receiver can commit to a
reward policy. That is, there is no value of commitment to a reward policy for the receiver.
Lastly, condition 2 above is a tie-breaking rule that applies only when reporting the evidence
endowment is optimal–it does not require the sender to report the optimal message that omits
the least information if reporting the evidence endowment is not optimal.
2.7. Notations. We conclude this section by introducing two auxiliary functions and
some notations related to disclosure rules. Let ν be a set function on E such that for all
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A ⊂ E and A 6= ∅,
(6) ν(A) =
FG(A)pi0
FG(A)pi0 + FB(A)(1− pi0) .
If A = {e} is a singleton, we write it as a function, and ν(e) is the sender’s private belief
on ω = G after observing evidence e, derived from the Bayes’ rule. By definition, it is also
the receiver’s posterior belief at an off-path message in a truth-leaning equilibrium. Given
any equilibrium, let V be a function such that V (e) = maxm-e a
⋆(m) for all e ∈ E. This is
referred to as the sender’s value function.
Given a disclosure rule -, we denote the asymmetric part by ≺ (i.e. e ≺ e′ ⇔ e - e′, e′ 6-
e), and the equivalence relation by ∼ (i.e. e ∼ e′ ⇔ e - e′, e′ - e). Let A ⊂ E and L ⊂ A be
nonempty. We say L is a lower contour set in A if for all e ∈ L and e′ ∈ A, e′ - e⇒ e′ ∈ L.
3. Main Results. In Theorem 1, we show that the sender’s equilibrium value function
is unique. That is, all equilibria of a disclosure game are payoff equivalent. Moreover, we
characterize the sender’s equilibrium value function by three conditions.
Theorem 1. A function V : E → [0, 1] is the sender’s value function in an equilibrium
if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. V : (E,-)→ ([0, 1],≤) is non-decreasing;
2. ν(V −1(x)) = x for all x ∈ Range(V );
3. ν(L) ≥ x for all x ∈ Range(V ) and all lower contour sets L in V −1(x).
Moreover, the function satisfying the above conditions is unique.
Rappoport (2017) shows a similar result with finite evidence space under a similar set-
up. A contribution of this paper is to provide an alternative and more straightforward
proof using induction which applies to disclosure games with infinite evidence spaces. The
induction process, described below and detailed in the proof of Theorem 1, can be used to
construct equilibrium strategies from the sender’s equilibrium value function.
We outline the proof for the “if” part here. That is, given a function V satisfying
conditions 1 though 3 of Theorem 1, we want to find an equilibrium such that V is the
sender’s value function. First, notice that in any equilibrium, if V (e) ≤ ν(e) at some e ∈ E,
then the sender reports e when her evidence endowment is e, and a⋆(e) = µ(e) = V (e); if
V (e) > ν(e), then e as a message is off-path, and a⋆(e) = µ(e) = ν(e). Since ν is determined
solely by FG and FB, given any V , a
⋆ and µ can be pinned down in any candidate equilibrium.
The remaining question is to find a reporting strategy σ⋆ that is optimal and truth-leaning,
and is consistent with µ and the Bayes’ rule at on-path messages. To do so, we consider the
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following induction process. Suppose that we have a candidate strategy of the sender defined
on a lower contour set L in E, satisfying the following two properties: (i) sender optimality
and truth-leaning are satisfies on L, and (ii) the receiver’s posterior belief at each on-path
message m ∈ L calculated by the Bayes’ rule is at least V (m). If L = E, the candidate
strategy is indeed an equilibrium strategy, and V is the sender’s value function in this
equilibrium. If L ( E, condition 3 of Theorem 1 ensures that there are “slacks” in property
(ii), and we can extend the candidate reporting strategy beyond L. Indeed, in the proof of
Theorem 1, we construct another candidate strategy defined on a lower contour set L˜ ) L
in E that satisfies properties (i) and (ii), so we may continue with the induction process.
If the evidence space is finite, the induction process solves an equilibrium strategy. If the
evidence space is not finite, using transfinite induction, we show existence of an equilibrium
such that V is the sender’s value function.
Since the sender’s value function is the same in all equilibria, we shall use the term
without refering to a specific equilibrium. Naturally, given the sender’s value function, we
can partition the evidence space by the sender’s equilibrium value. The following corollary
formalizes this idea using the notion of ordered partition4 and states an equivalent result of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. An equilibrium exists if and only if there exists an ordered partition of
E, denoted by (A,≤P ), satisfying:
1. ν : (A,≤P )→ ([0, 1],≤) is strictly increasing;
2. For all A1, A2 ∈ A and e1 ∈ A1, e2 ∈ A2, e1 - e2 ⇒ A1 ≤P A2;
3. For all A ∈ A and all lower contour sets L in A, ν(L) ≥ ν(A).
Moreover, the sender’s value function V satisfies V (e) = ν(A(e)) for all e ∈ E, where
A(e) ∈ A is such that A(e) ∋ e. The ordered partition satisfying the above conditions is
unique.
We refer to the ordered partition (A,≤P ) in Corollary 2 as the equilibrium partition.
Corollary 2 provides useful conditions to verify whether an ordered partition is the equilib-
rium partition, but it provides little insight on existence of equilibrium or how to solve the
equilibrium partition. On the other hand, Hart et al. (2017) show that truth-leaning equi-
librium exists in disclosure games with finite evidence spaces using the standard existence
argument of Nash equilibrium, but their result does not help constructing an equilibrium
either. Although we are unable to show existence when the evidence space is countably infi-
nite, we further charaterizes the equilibrium partition in the following theorem and propose
4An ordered partition (Stanley, 1999) is a partition with a total order defined on the sets of the partition.
Recall that a total order ≤ (on a set X) is a partial order that is also connex (∀x, x′ ∈ X , x ≤ x′ or x′ ≤ x).
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an induction process which solves the equilibrium partition for a broad class of disclosure
games, including those with finite evidence spaces and the model of left-censored disclosure
presented in Section 4.
Theorem 3. An ordered partition (A,≤P ) of E is the equilibrium partition if and only
if every A ∈ A is the largest lower contour set in E \⋃A′<PAA′ that minimizes ν. That is,
A solves
(7) min
L
ν(L) s.t. L is a lower contour set in E \
⋃
A′<PA
A′,
and for all L that solves (7), L ⊂ A.
Following Theorem 3, we propose an induction process to construct the equilibrium
partition. First, solve the minimization problem
min
L
ν(L) s.t. L is a lower contour set in E.
As is shown in the proof of Theorem 3, if the above problem admits a minimizer, then it
has a largest minimizer. Denote by A0 this largest minimizer. Now suppose that for some
n ∈ N, A0, A1, . . . , An are such that every Ak is the largest lower contour set in E \
⋃
i<k Ai
that minimizes ν. We solve the minimization problem
min
L
ν(L) s.t. L is a lower contour set in E \
⋃
i≤n
Ai.
If the above minimization problem admits a minimizer, then it has a largest minimizer. Let
An+1 be this largest lower contour set, and we can proceed by induction.
By Theorem 3, if the equilibrium partition is finite, then the above induction process ends
after finite steps, and the resulted partition A = {A0, A1, . . . , An}, along with the total order
≤P such that Ai ≤P Aj ⇔ i ≤ j, is the quilibrium partition. Specifically, the above induction
process solves the equilibrium partition when the evidence space is finite. If the equilibrium
partition is not finite, but sets in A can be indexed by N such that Ai ≤P Aj ⇔ i ≤ j,
then every An is solved by the above induction process. Conversely, if every An in the above
induction process is well defined, and
⋃
n∈NAn = E, then an equilibrium exists, and the
equilibrium partition is given by A = {An}n∈N and ≤P such that Ai ≤P Aj ⇔ i ≤ j.
4. Disclosure of Left-Censored Data. This section models the leading example of
left-censored disclosure in Section 1. The hedge fund manager is the sender, and the investor
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is the receiver. The two possible states, G and B, corresponds to the hedge fund being a
success and a failure, respectively. We first specify the evidence space and the disclosure
rule, and then discuss the equilibrium features.
4.1. Evidence. The evidence space E =
⋃∞
t=0{g, b}t. A piece of evidence e ∈ E is a se-
quence of binary signals. A typical element of length L > 0 is denoted by e = (s1, s2, . . . , sL),
where each st ∈ {g, b}. This can be interpreted as a trading record of the incubation trial,
and each signal st represents the return on the t-th trading day–st = g stands for high return,
and st = b stands for low return.
There is a “null” evidence (i.e. the evidence of length zero), denoted by ∅. For every
e ∈ E, let L(e) denote the length of e, G(e) the number of g’s in e, B(e) the number of b’s in
e, and D(e) = G(h)− B(h) the difference between the number of g’ and b’s. Moreover, for
every e of length L > 0 and 0 < k ≤ L, let e|k = (sL−k+1, sL−k+2, . . . , sL) denote a truncation
of e from the left. As a convention, e|0 = ∅ for all e ∈ E.
Let the two distributions FG and FB be as follows:
(8) Fω(e) = (1− p− q)pKqL(e)−K
for all e ∈ E and ω ∈ {G,B}, where K = G(e) if ω = G and K = B(e) if ω = B, and p, q
are such that 1 > p > q > 0 and 1 > p+ q > 0.
Given the specification in (8), the length of evidence follows a geometric distribution
and is not informative about the realized state. Given the length of evidence, each signal
is an independent draw from a Bernoulli distribution–with probability p
p+q
, it indicates the
realized state; with the complement probability q
p+q
, it indicates the alternative state. The
informativeness of each signal is constant over time and symmetric across states.
4.2. Left censoring disclosure rule. Given her evidence endowment, the sender can dis-
close a set of most recent signals and conceal earlier signals, i.e. she can report a truncation
of her evidence endowment. This defines the left censoring disclosure rule. Formally, it is a
partial order -, such that e1 - e2 ⇔ e1 = e2|L(e1).
4.3. Equilibrium characterization. The sender’s value function is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium value function). Let N : E → N be defined by
N(e) = max
k≤L(e)
D(e|k).
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An equilibrium exists, and the sender’s value function is
(9) V (e) =
1
1 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
(
q
p
)N(e)+1 ,
where α = 1−
√
1−4pq
2
.
The proposition states that in any equilibrium, given an evidence endowment e, the
sender’s equilibrium value is determined by N(e), which is the maximal difference between
the number of g’s and the number of b’s among all truncations. Senders with different
evidence endowment but a same value of N receive the same payoff in any equilibrium.
We now characterize the sender’s equilibrium strategy. A seemingly optimal strategy for
the sender with evidence endowment e is to report e|k such that D(e|k) = N(e). Disclosing
any other message m appears to be sub-optimal, since from the receiver’s perspectives, m
is worse than e|k if interpreted at face value (i.e. ν(m) < ν(e|k)). However, this is not
necessarily the case. In fact, the sender sometimes report longer messages which include
redundant and seemingly unfavorable information at the beginning of the messages. The
receiver, on the other hand, is not influenced by the unfavorable information in on-path
messages and acts the same as if only e|k is reported.
Notice that for all e ∈ E, ν(e) ≥ V (e) if D(e) ≥ N(e)− n⋆, where
(10) n⋆ = logp/q
(
p− α
q − α
)
− 1 > 0
is a constant determined solely by the model parameters p and q. Hence, in any equilibrium,
an evidence endowment e is disclosed without omission so long as D(e) ≥ N(e) − n⋆. This
demonstrates our first point. That is, seemingly unfavorable information may be reported
on-path. Specifically, if
(11) (p+ q)(1− p− q) ≤ pq,
then n⋆ ≥ 1, and in any equilibrium, some seemingly unfavorable information is disclosed.
For instance, evidence e = (b) is disclosed without omission in any equilibrium under the
parametric assumption (11), even though reporting the null evidence is feasible and seemingly
better in that ν(∅) > ν((b)). This result may appear similar to the result in Dziuda (2011),
but the strategic reasoning underlying these results are different. In Dziuda (2011), the
sender discloses unfavorable signals in order to be perceived as being honest. In the current
paper, it is an act of coordination between senders with different evidence endowment: if
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all senders whose evidence endowment has a same optimal truncation pool on reporting
the same message, the persuasiveness of the message is so undermined that some senders
will find it profitable to deviate. Instead, senders pool on several messages, including those
seemingly sub-optimal ones, such that all of them have the same persuasiveness and yield a
strictly higher payoff than deviating to other feasible messages.
Secondly, when there are multiple truncations that yield the maximal difference between
the number of g’s and the number of b’s, the sender’s message always contains the longest
truncation. That is, in any equilibrium, L(m) ≥ max(argmaxkD(e|k)) for all e ∈ E and
m ∈ supp(σ⋆(·|e)). For instance, the sender with evidence endowment (b, b, b, g, b) will
always include the two most recent signals (g, b) in her message, although both truncations
(g, b) and ∅ contain the same number of g’s and b’s. This result follows from the fact that
ν(E−0 ) = ν(E0), where E
−
0 is the set containing the null evidence and all evidence such
that every truncation has strictly more b’s than g’s, and E0 is the set of evidence such that
N(e) = 0. Notice that E−0 is a lower contour set in E0. Therefore, no evidence e ∈ E0\E−0 can
report a message m ∈ E−0 with positive probability in any equilibrium: after accommodating
all reports from e ∈ E−0 , the sender’s posterior beliefs at on-path messages in E−0 is already
ν(E0); any further pooling from evidence outside the set E
−
0 will make the posterior beliefs
at these messages too low. Specifically, since (b, b, b, g, b) ∈ E0 \ E−0 , and ∅, (b) ∈ E−0 , the
sender with evidence endowment (b, b, b, g, b) will disclose at least the two most recent signals
(g, b) in her message.
Lastly, since all evidence e with a same value of N(e) yield the same sender’s equilibrium
value, the receiver’s action is not affected by the unfavorable information revealed by the
sender in equilibrium. Unless the message contains so many bad signals that it is not an on-
path message, the receiver will act based solely on the favorable information in the message,
i.e. his posterior depends on N(m) instead of D(m).
The proposition below summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium strategies). In any equilibrium (σ⋆, a⋆, µ), for all e ∈ E:
1. a⋆(e) = µ(e) = min{V (e), ν(e)}, where V is given by (9);
2. σ⋆(e|e) = 1 if and only if D(e) ≥ N(e)− n⋆, where n⋆ > 0 is given by (10);
3. If σ⋆(m|e) > 0, then L(m) ≥ max(argmaxkN(e|k)).
4.4. Comparative statics. The following proposition shows how the sender’s equilibrium
value change with respect to parameters p and q. Notice that increasing, say p, while holding
q constant introduces two effects: on the one hand, it increases the informativeness of each
signal; on the other hand, the expected length of the sender’s evidence endowment increases.
We introduce the following notations to disentangle the two effects. Let γ = p
q
> 1 be the
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(a) V (e) as a function of κ and γ (N(e) = 2) (b) The sender’s values as functions of p (q = 15)
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Figure 1: Comparative statics results (pi0 =
1
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informativeness of each signal, and κ = 1
1−p−q the expected length of the sender’s evidence
endowment. Given γ > 1 and κ > 1, p and q are determined.
Proposition 6 (Comparative statics). The following are true:
1. V (e) is decreasing in κ for all e ∈ E.
2. If N(e) = 0, V (e) is decreasing in γ. If N(e) > 0, there exists γˆ > 1 such that V (e) is
increasing in γ when γ > γˆ, and the threshold γˆ → 1 as N(e)→∞.
3. Fixing e ∈ E and q ∈ (0, 1
2
), there exists pˆ ∈ [q, 1 − q) such that V (e) is increasing in
p if p < pˆ and decreasing in p if p > pˆ, and the threshold pˆ is non-decreasing in N(e).
The proposition shows different effects of increasing the informativeness of signals and
increasing the length of evidence on the sender’s equilibrium value. As is demonstrated in
Figure 1(a) for N(e) = 2, increasing the expected length of the sender’s evidene endow-
ment always decreases the sender’s equilibrium value, whereas the sender may benefit from
increased informativeness of signals. When κ is small, the sender’s equilibrium value is
monotone increasing in γ; when κ is large, the sender’s equilibrium value first decreases and
then increases as γ increases. The proposition shows that there exists a threshold γˆ > 1,
independent of κ, such that the sender’s value increases in γ for all γ > γˆ and κ > 1. An
equivalent interpretation of the result is that the effect of increasing the informativeness of
signals depends on the sender’s evidence endowment. Fixing γ > 1, there is a threshold
nˆ ≥ 1 such that the sender benefits from increasing the informativeness of signals if her evi-
dence endowment is such that N(e) > nˆ. That is, increasing the informativeness of signals
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benefits the sender if her evidence endowment is relatively favorable.
Combining the two competing effects, the effect of increasing p on the sender’s equilib-
rium value depends on the sender’s evidence endowment and is generally not monotonic.
This is demonstrated in Figure 1(b). If the sender’s evidence endowment is relatively unfa-
vorable (specifically, if N(e) = 0), increasing p decreases the sender’s equilibrium value. If
the sender’s evidence endowment is relatively favorable, the sender’s equilibrium value first
increases and then decreases as p increases. When p approaches 1−q, the expected length of
the sender’s evidence endowment tends to infinity. Regardless of what the sender discloses,
the receiver believes that there are infinitely many signals being omitted, and his skepticism
becomes so overwhelming that the sender receives almost zero payoff in equilibrium.
5. Conclusion. There are many situations where communication relies on hard evi-
dence. However, even when information is verifiable, a party may withold key information
from others if their interests are not perfectly aligned. In this paper, we model disclosure
rules as preorders on a countable evidence space and study a unified framework of disclosure
games.
We show that in any disclosure game, all equilibria are payoff equivalent, and the unique
equilibrium value function of the sender is characterized by three conditions. Related to
this result, we present two induction processes. The first one can be used to construct an
equilibrium from the sender’s equilibrium value function, and the second process solves the
sender’s equilibrium value function for a broad class of disclosure games.
Applying these general results, we study a model of left-censored disclosure. In this
model, evidence is a sequence of signals, and the sender is allowed to disclose a truncation of
her evidence endowment to the receiver. In equilibrium, there is no unravelling. Moreover,
seemingly sub-optimal messages are reported by the sender, and the sender’s equilibrium
strategy favors longer messages over shorter ones, although the length of evidence has no
intrinsic value in our model. Lastly, we show that increasing the expected length of ev-
idence always decreases the sender’s equilibrium value, while the effect of increasing the
informativeness of signals depends on the sender’s evidence endowment.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. Preliminaries. We will repeatedly use Zorn’s lemma in the proofs of our results.
The statement of the lemma is as below. Recall that given a partially ordered set (X,≤),
a chain is a totally ordered subset of X , an upper bound of a subset A ⊂ X is an element
x ∈ X such that x ≥ y for all y ∈ A, and a maximal element of X is an element x ∈ X such
15
that y ≥ x⇒ y = x.
Lemma A.1 (Zorn’s lemma). Let X be a partially ordered set. If every chain in X has
an upper bound, then X has a maximal element.
By (A4′) and Zorn’s lemma, for all nonempty sets A ⊂ E, the set of minimal elements
min(A,-) is nonempty.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1. We divide the proof into a sequence of lemmas. Lemma
A.2 and Lemma A.3 show that a function V : E → [0, 1] is the sender’s value function in
an equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem 1. Lemma A.4
shows that the value function is unique.
Lemma A.2 (Necessity). Let (σ⋆, a⋆, µ) be an equilibrium, and V the sender’s value
function. Then V satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem 1.
Proof. Condition 1 is by definition. If e1 - e2, LC(e1) ⊂ LC(e2). Hence, V (e1) =
maxm∈LC(e1) a
⋆(m) ≤ maxm∈LC(e2) a⋆(m) = V (e2). V is non-decreasing.
For condition 2, let Mx =
⋃
e∈V −1(x) supp(σ
⋆(·|e)) be the set of on-path messages which
yield sender value x. For all m ∈Mx,
(A.1) x = µ(m) =
∑
e∈V −1(x) σ
⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈V −1(x) σ
⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)] .
Rearranging and summing (A.1) over m ∈Mx yields x = ν(V −1(x)).
For condition 3, let ML =
⋃
e∈L supp(σ
⋆(·|e)) be the set of on-path messages reported by
senders with evidence endowment in L. By assumption, ML ⊂ L. Hence, for all m ∈ ML
and e ∈ V −1(x) \ L, if σ⋆(m|e) > 0, reporting e is not optimal at evidence endowment e.
Therefore, e is off-path as a message, and
(A.2) x = V (e) > ν(e) =
FG(e)pi0
FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0) .
Rewriting (A.1) and using (A.2),
(A.3)
x =
(∑
e∈L+
∑
e∈V −1(x)\L
) (
σ⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0
)
(∑
e∈L+
∑
e∈V −1(x)\L
) (
σ⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
)
≤
∑
e∈L σ
⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈L σ
⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)] .
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Rearranging and summing (A.3) over m ∈ML yields the desired result, i.e. x ≤ ν(L).
Lemma A.3 (Sufficiency). Let V : E → [0, 1] be a function satisfying conditions 1 through
3 of Theorem 1. Then there exists an equilibrium in which the sender’s value function is V .
Proof. Notice that in any equilibrium (σ⋆, a⋆, µ) and for all e ∈ E, one of the following
two cases happens:5
1. The sender with evidence endowment e reports e, and a⋆(e) = µ(e) = V (e) ≤ ν(e);
2. e is off-path as a message, and a⋆(e) = µ(e) = ν(e) < ν(e).
Therefore, given V , any candidate equilibrium (σ, a, µ) in which the sender’s value function
is V must satisfy
(A.4) a(e) = µ(e) = min{V (e), ν(e)}
for all e ∈ E. Moreover, the set of on-path messages is O := {e : V (e) ≤ ν(e)}. Since
ν depends solely on FG and FB, and V is given, the receiver’s strategy and beliefs are
determined by (A.4). The remainder of the proof constructs a sender’s strategy that is
sender optimal and truth-leaning, and makes µ consistent on-path. We do so by induction.
Suppose that for some lower contour set L in E, we have a candidate strategy. That is,
suppose that we have a collection of distributions {σ(·|e)}e∈L satisfying the following:
(A.5) supp(σ(·|e)) ⊂ LC(e) ∩ V −1(V (e)) ∩ O;
(A.6) σ(e|e) = 1 for all e ∈ O;
(A.7) µ(m) ≤
∑
e∈L σ(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈L σ(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
for all m ∈ O ∩ L.
If L = E, (σ, a, µ) is an equilibrium in which the sender’s value function is V . Sender
optimality and truth-leaning are guaranteed by (A.5) and (A.6), respectively. Suppose that
Bayesian consistency is not satisfied. Then at some m⋆ ∈ O, (A.7) holds with strict inequal-
ity. Let x = V (m⋆). Rearranging and summing (A.7) over m ∈ V −1(x) ∩ O, and noticing
that at m⋆, (A.7) holds with strict inequality, we have
x <
FG(V
−1(x))pi0
FG(V −1(x))pi0 + FB(V −1(x))(1− pi0) = ν(V
−1(x)) = x,
5A proof for this observation can be found in Hart et al. (2017).
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which is a contradiction. Hence, if L = E, we have an equilibrium in which the sender’s
value function is V .
If L ( E, let e⋆ be a minimal element in E \ L, i.e. e - e⋆ ⇒ e ∼ e⋆ for all e ∈ E \ L.
We show below that we can extend the cadidate sender’s strategy to L˜ := L ∪ [e⋆], where
[e⋆] = {e : e ∼ e⋆} is the equivalence class of e⋆. That is, we define σ(·|e) for all e ∈ [e⋆] such
that the collection {σ(·|e)}e∈L˜ satisfies (A.5) through (A.7).
Let m1, m2, . . . be the elements in P := L˜∩ V −1(V (e⋆))∩O such that mi ≺ mj ⇒ i < j.
We extend the candidate strategy as follows. First, let σ(m|e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e⋆] and all
m /∈ P , and let σ(e|e) = 1 and σ(e′|e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e⋆] ∩ P and all e′ 6= e. By doing so,
(A.5) and (A.6) are satisfied. If [e⋆] ⊂ P , (A.7) is also satisfied, since for all e ∈ [e⋆],
µ(e) ≤ ν(e) = FG(e)pi0
FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0) .
Hence ,we already have an extension. If [e⋆] 6⊂ P , let e1, e2, . . . be the elements of [e⋆] \ P ,
and define σ(mi|ej) recursively as follows:
σ(mj |ei) = max
{
fi(mj), 1−
j−1∑
k=1
σ(mk|ei)
}
,
with the initial condition
σ(m1|e1) = max
{
S(m1)
−FG(e1)pi0(1− µ(m1)) + FB(e1)(1− pi0)µ(m1)] , 1
}
,
where
fi(mj) =
S(mj)−
∑i−1
k=1 σ(mj|ek)[−FG(ek)pi0(1− µ(mj)) + FB(ek)(1− pi0)µ(mj)]
−FG(ei)pi0(1− µ(mj)) + FB(ei)(1− pi0)µ(mj) ,
and
S(mj) =
∑
e∈L∪{mj}
σ(mj |e)[FG(e)pi0(1− µ(mj))− FB(e)(1− pi0)µ(mj)].
Intuitively, S(mj) ≥ 0 is the slackness in (A.7) at mj . If S(mj) > 0, then the sender with
some evidence endowment in [e⋆]\P can assign positive probability on reporting mj without
violating (A.7). Following the above process, {σ(·|e)}e∈L˜ constructed satisfies (A.5) through
(A.7). Moreover, L˜ by definition is a lower contour set in E. We are left to check that σ(·|ei)
is well-defined, i.e.
∑
j σ(mj |ei) = 1 for all i. Suppose not, then at some ei,
∑
j σ(mj |ei) < 1.
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Moreover, it must be the case that there remains no slackness at any mj , i.e.
(A.8) V (e⋆) = µ(mj) =
∑
e∈L˜ σ(mj |e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈L˜ σ(mj |e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)]
for all mj . Notice that
∑
j σ(mj |ei) < 1 and ν(ei) < V (ei) = V (e⋆). Therefore, rearranging
(A.8) and summing over j, we have
V (e⋆) > ν(L˜ ∩ V −1(V (e⋆))),
which is a contradiction to condition 3 of Theorem 1. Hence, {σ(·|e)}e∈L˜ constructed through
the above process extends {σ(·|e)}e∈L and is a candidate strategy defined on a lower contour
set of E.
We can now proceed with transfinite induction. Let S be the space of all candidate strate-
gies defined on some lower contour set of E. Let Σ1 = {σ1(·|e)}e∈L1 and Σ2 = {σ2(·|e)}e∈L2
be two typical elements in S. We can define a partial order, denoted by ⊏, on S, such that
Σ1 ⊏ Σ2 if and only if Σ2 extends Σ1, i.e. L1 ⊂ L2, and σ1(·|e) = σ2(·|e) for all e ∈ L1. For
every chain C = {Σα}α∈I in S, it has an upper bound {σ˜(·|e)}e∈L˜ defined on L˜ := ∪α∈ILα,
where σ˜(·|e) = σα(·|e) for some α ∈ I such that Lα ∋ e.6 By Zorn’s lemma, S has a
maximal element. Let Σˆ = {σˆ(·|e)}e∈Lˆ be one such maximal element, where Lˆ is a lower
contour set in E. If Lˆ 6= E, we can extend Σˆ. This contradicts the assumption that Σˆ is a
maximal element. Hence, Lˆ = E, and by the earlier argument, (σˆ, a, µ) is an equilibrium in
which the sender’s value function is V .
It remains to show that S is nonempty, i.e. there exists a candidate strategy. Notice that
the extension process discussed above applies even when L = ∅. When L = ∅, let e⋆ be a
minimal element of E, and P = [e⋆]∩O is nonempty by condition 2 of Theorem 1. Following
the extension process, we can construct a candidate strategy defined on [e⋆]. Hence, S is
nonempty.
Lemma A.4 (Uniqueness). The function that satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem
1 is unique.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that V 6= W are two functions that satisfy
conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, there exist e1, e2 such that
6Since C is totally ordered, for all α, α′ ∈ I , Σα ⊏ Σα′ or Σα′ ⊏ Σα. Therefore, if e is in both Lα and
Lα′ , σα(·|e) = σα′(·|e). We can define σ˜(·|e) using any α ∈ I such that Lα ∋ e.
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V (e1) = V (e2) and W (e1) < W (e2).
7 Let
Lw =
⋃
x≤W (e1)
W−1(x), Uw =
⋃
x≥W (e2)
W−1(x),
Lv =
⋃
y≤V (e1)
V −1(y), Uv =
⋃
y≥V (e2)
V −1(y).
By condition 1 of Theorem 1, Lw is a lower contour set in E. Therefore, for all y ≥ V (e2)
and y ∈ Range(V ), V −1(y)∩Lw is a lower contour set in V −1(y). By condition 3 of Theorem
1, ν(V −1(y)∩Lw) ≥ y ≥ V (e2). Hence, ν(Uv ∩Lw) ≥ V (e2). But Uv is an upper contour set
in E. Therefore, for all x ≤ W (e1) and x ∈ Range(W ), Uv ∩W−1(x) is an upper contour
set in W−1(x), so ν(Uv ∩W−1(x)) ≤ x ≤W (e1). Hence, ν(Uv ∩ Lw) ≤W (e1). That is,
(A.9) V (e2) ≤ ν(Uv ∩ Lw) ≤W (e1).
Similarly, we can show that
(A.10) W (e2) ≤ ν(Uw ∩ Lv) ≤ V (e1).
The inequalities in (A.9) and (A.10) contradict the assumptions that W (e1) < W (e2) and
V (e1) = V (e2). Hence, the function that satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem 1 is
unique.
A.3. Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof. Given an equilibrium and the sender’s value function V , we can define an ordered
partition (A,≤P ) of E as follows: A := {V −1(x) : x ∈ Range(V )}, and A1 ≤P A2 ⇔
ν(A1) ≤ ν(A2). By construction, the orderd partition (A,≤P ) satisfies conditions 1 and 3
of Corollary 2. By Theorem 1, for all A1, A2 ∈ A and e1 ∈ A1, e2 ∈ A2 such that e1 - e2,
ν(A1) = V (e1) ≤ V (e2) = ν(A2). That is, A1 ≤P A2, and condition 2 of Corollary 2 is
satisfied.
Given any ordered partition (A,≤P ) of E that satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Corollary
2, we can define V : E → [0, 1] as follows: V (e) = ν(A) for all A ∈ A and e ∈ A. By
construction, V satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of Theorem 1, so it is the sender’s value
function in an equilibrium.
7Otherwise, either for all e1 6= e2, V (e1) 6= V (e2) and W (e1) 6= W (e2), or V (e1) = V (e2) ⇔ W (e1) =
W (e2). In the former case, V (e) = W (e) = ν(e) for all e ∈ E, which is a contradiction. In the latter case,
for all x ∈ Range(V ), ∃y ∈ Range(W ) such that V −1(x) =W−1(y) (and vice versa). But by condition 2 of
Theorem 1, x = ν(V −1(x)) = ν(V −1(y)) = y. Hence, V =W , which is a contradiction.
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Let (A,≤P ) and (A⋆,≤⋆P ) both satisfy conditions 1 through 3 of Corollary 2. Suppose
that A 6= A⋆. Then, without loss of generality, there exist e, e′ ∈ E, A,A′ ∈ A, A 6= A′,
and A⋆ ∈ A⋆ such that e ∈ A, e′ ∈ A′, e, e′ ∈ A⋆. Hence, V (e) = V (e′) = ν(A⋆). But
V (e) = ν(A) 6= ν(A′) = V (e′). Contradiction reached. Hence, A = A⋆. By condition 1 of
Corollary 2, A1 ≤P A2 ⇔ ν(A1) ≤ ν(A2)⇔ A1 ≤⋆P A2 for all A1, A2 ∈ A = A⋆. Hence, ≤P
is also identical to ≤⋆P . That is, (A,≤P ) = (A⋆,≤⋆P ). Uniqueness is shown.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. For the “if” part, let (A,≤P ) be an ordered partition of E such that every A ∈ A
is the largest minimizer of (7). We show that (A,≤P ) satisfies conditions 1 through 3 of
Corollary 2 and therefore is the equilibrium partition. Suppose that condition 1 is violated.
Then there exist A1 <P A2 such that ν(A1) ≥ ν([A1, A2]), where [A1, A2] = ∪A1≤PA′≤PA2A′.
This contradicts the assumption that A1 is the largest minimizer of (7). Hence, condition 1
is satisfied. Let A1, A2 ∈ A, e1 ∈ A1, e2 ∈ A2 such that e1 - e2. Since A2 is a lower contour
set in E \ ∪A′<PA2A′, e1 ∈ A2 or e1 ∈ ∪A′<PA2A′. Hence, A1 ≤P A2; condition 2 is satisfied.
Let A ∈ A, and L a lower contour set in A. Since L is a lower contour set in E \ ∪A′<PAA′,
by minimization, ν(L) ≥ ν(A); condition 3 is satisfied.
For the “only if” part, suppose that (A,≤P ) is the equilibrium partition, we are to show
that every A ∈ A is the largest minimizer of (7). To obtain a contradiction, consider two
separate cases. First, suppose that for some A0 ∈ A, A0 does not solve (7). Then there exists
a lower contour set L in E \⋃A′<PA0 A′ such that ν(L) < ν(A0). Notice that {A∩L}A≥PA0
is a partition of L, and by assumption, ν(A ∩ L) ≥ ν(A) ≥ ν(A0) for all A ≥P A0 such that
A∩L 6= ∅. Hence, ν(L) ≥ ν(A0), a contradiction. Second, suppose that there exists A0 ∈ A
that is not the largest minimizer of (7). Then there exists A′0 6⊂ A0 that solves (7). Since
A′0 \ A0 is an upper contour set in A′0, ν(A′0 \ A0) ≤ ν(A′0) = ν(A0). But {A ∩ A′0}A>PA0 is
a partition of A′0 \ A0, and by assumption, ν(A ∩ A′0) ≥ ν(A) > ν(A0) for all A >P A0 such
that A ∩A′0 6= ∅. Hence, ν(A′0 \ A0) > ν(A0), a contradiction.
Remark. If (7) admits a minimizer, it has a (unique) largest minimizer. Denote by L
the set of minimizers to (7), and suppose that it is not empty. Let v be the minimum of (7).
For every chain {Lα}α∈I in (L,⊂), there is an upper bound L¯ := ∪α∈ILα in (L,⊂). By
Zorn’s lemma, there exists a maximal element of (L,⊂). Let L⋆ be one maximal element.
Spupose that L⋆ is not the greatest element in (L,⊂), then there exists L′ ∈ L such that
L′ 6⊂ L⋆. If L′ and L⋆ are disjoint, it is easy to see that ν(L⋆ ∪ L′) = v, so L⋆ ∪ L′ ∈ L. If
L′ ∪ L⋆ 6= ∅, by minimization, ν(L′ ∩ L⋆) ≥ v, so ν(L′ \ L⋆) ≤ v and ν(L⋆ ∪ L′) ≤ v. But
L⋆ ∪ L′ is a lower contour set in E \ ⋃i<nAi, so ν(L⋆ ∪ L′) = v, and L⋆ ∪ L′ ∈ L. This is
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a contradiction to maximality of L⋆, as L⋆ ∪ L′ ) L⋆. Hence, L⋆ is the largest minimizer of
(7).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Since N is non-decreasing and p > q, V is non-decreasing. Let En = {e ∈ E :
N(e) = n} for every n ∈ N. For all x ∈ Range(V ), V −1(x) = En for some n ∈ N. We are to
verify conditions 2 and 3 of Theorem 1 for every En.
Notice that E0 = {∅} ∪ {(b, h) : h ∈ E0 ∪ E1}, and En = {(g, h) : h ∈ En−1} ∪ {(b, h) :
h ∈ En+1} for all n ≥ 1. Hence,
Fω(E0) = (1− p− q) + pI{ω=B}qI{ω=G} · (Fω(E0) + Fω(E1));
Fω(En) = p
I{ω=G}qI{ω=B} · Fω(En−1) + pI{ω=B}qI{ω=G} · Fω(En+1) for all n ≥ 1;
∞∑
n=0
Fω(En) = 1.
It follows that
FG(En) =
q − α
q
(
α
q
)n
; FB(En) =
p− α
p
(
α
p
)n
.
Hence, for all n ∈ N and e ∈ En,
ν(En) =
1
1 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
(
q
p
)n+1 = V (e);
condition 2 is satisfied.
We now verify condition 3. Notice that for all n ∈ N and e ∈ En, e can be uniquely
decomposed into two parts, as follows:
e = (e0, e
min
n ),
where e0 ∈ E0, and eminn ∈ min(En,-). Therefore, every lower counter set L in E0 can be
partitioned into at most countably many subsets, each having the form
(A.11) {(e0, eminn ) : e0 ∈ L0},
where eminn ∈ min(En,-), and L0 is a lower contour set in E0. Hence, it suffices to show
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that, for all sets L′ of the form (A.11), ν(L′) ≥ ν(En). Notice that
ν(L′) =
1
1 + 1−π0
π0
FB(L0)
FG(L0)
(
q
p
)n ,
and
ν(En) =
1
1 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
(
q
p
)n+1 .
It is equivalent to show that ν(L0) ≥ ν(E0) for all lower contour sets L0 in E0.
Suppose that this is not true. Then for some small ε > 0, there exists a lower contour
set L0 in E0 such that ν(L0) ≤ ν(E0)− ε. Without loss of generality, choose
ε < ν(E0)− 1
1 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
.
Denote by Lε the nonempty set of all lower contour sets L0 in E0 such that ν(L0) ≤ ν(E0)−ε.
Notice that every chain {Lα}α∈I in (Lε,⊂) has an upper bound
⋃
α∈I Lα. Therefore, there
exists a maximal element L⋆ε in Lε by Zorn’s lemma. To obtain a contradiction, let us discuss
the following two cases.
If there exists e⋆ ∈ min(E0 \ L⋆ε,-) such that D(e⋆) < 0, then L˜ε := L⋆ε ∪ {(e0, e⋆) : e0 ∈
E0} is a lower contour set in E0, and ν(L˜ε) ≤ ν(E0)− ε, since
ν({(e0, e⋆) : e0 ∈ E0}) = 1
1 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
(
q
p
)D(e⋆)+1 ≤ 11 + 1−π0
π0
p−α
q−α
< ν(E0)− ε.
Hence, L˜ε ∈ Lε. But L⋆ε ( L˜ε, a contradiction to maximality of L⋆ε.
If D(e⋆) = 0 for all e⋆ ∈ min(E0 \ L⋆ε,-), then
E0 \ L⋆ε =
⋃
e⋆∈min(E0\L⋆ε ,-)
{(e0, e⋆) : e0 ∈ E0}.
Since ν({(e0, e⋆) : e0 ∈ E0}) = ν(E0) for all e⋆ ∈ min(E0 \L⋆ε,-), ν(E0 \L⋆ε) = ν(E0). Hence,
ν(L⋆ε) = ν(E0), a contradiction.
Therefore, ν(L0) ≥ ν(E0) for all lower contour set L0 in E0, and condition 3 is verified.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. 1 is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 as (A.4), and 2 is by calculation found in the
main text. 3 is clearly true if at e, it is optimal to disclose without omission. Hence, the proof
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is concluded once we show that 3 holds for evidence endowment eˆ such that ν(eˆ) < V (eˆ). Let
eˆ ∈ En, and let 0 ≤ k1 < k2 < · · · < kl = k⋆ be the elements in argmaxkD(eˆ|k). For each 1 ≤
i ≤ l, let Ki := {(e−0 , eˆ|ki) : e−0 ∈ E−0 }, where E−0 = {∅} ∪ {e : D(e|k) < 0, ∀0 < k ≤ L(e)}.
It is equivalent to show that supp(σ⋆(·|eˆ)) ⊂ Kl, so that eˆ|k⋆ - m for all m ∈ supp(σ⋆(·|eˆ)).
We show this by induction.
First, notice that for all e ⊂ K1, sender optimality requires that supp(σ⋆(·|e)) ⊂ K1.
Now, assume that for some i < l, we have supp(σ⋆(·|e)) ⊂ Kj for all e ∈ Kj and 1 ≤ j ≤ i.
Suppose that there exist e ∈ Ki+1, j ≤ i, and m ∈ Kj , such that σ⋆(m|e) > 0, and argue by
contradiction. Rearraging (A.8) and summing over all on-path messages in Kj, we have:
V (eˆ) =
(∑
e∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj +
∑
e/∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj
)
(σ⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0)(∑
e∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj +
∑
e/∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj
)
(σ⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)])
.
By assumption,
∑
e∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj σ
⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj σ
⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)] = ν(Kj) = V (eˆ),
and ∑
e/∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj σ
⋆(m|e)FG(e)pi0∑
e/∈Kj
∑
m∈Kj σ
⋆(m|e)[FG(e)pi0 + FB(e)(1− pi0)] < V (eˆ).
Therefore, V (eˆ) < V (eˆ), which is a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that for all e ∈
Ki+1, supp(σ
⋆(·|e)) ⊂ Ki+1. By induction, this holds for Kl. Since eˆ ∈ Kl, supp(σ⋆(·|eˆ)) ⊂
Kl.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. For 1, notice that
(A.12)
p− α
q − α =
2p− 1 +√1− 4pq
2q − 1 +√1− 4pq
=
(
√
1− 4pq + 2p− 1)(√1− 4pq − 2q + 1)
(1− 4pq)− (2q − 1)2
=
2(p+ q)− 8pq + 2(p− q)√1− 4pq
4q(1− p− q)
=
1
2
(γ + 1)κ− 2 γ
γ + 1
(κ− 1) + 1
2
(γ − 1)
√
∆
=
(γ − 1)2
2(γ + 1)
κ +
2γ
γ + 1
+
1
2
(γ − 1)
√
∆,
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where
∆ = κ2 − 4γ
(γ + 1)2
(κ− 1)2
is increasing in κ. Hence, (A.12) is increasing in κ, and V (e) given by (9) is decreasing in κ.
For 2, let us first consider the case of N(e) = N > 0. Notice that
√
∆ is bounded from
above by κ and from below by γ−1
γ+1
κ. Applying the lower bound,
p− α
q − α >
(γ − 1)2
γ + 1
κ+
2γ
γ + 1
.
Applying both bounds and omitting the negative term of 1
κ
,
(A.13)
∂
∂γ
(
p− α
q − α
)
=
1
2
κ− 2
(γ + 1)2
(κ− 1) + 1
2
√
∆+
1√
∆
γ − 1
(γ + 1)3
(κ− 1)
<
γ2 + 2γ − 1
(γ + 1)2
κ+
3
(γ + 1)2
.
Hence,
(A.14)
∂
∂γ
[
p− α
q − α
(
q
p
)N+1]
=
1
γN+1
[
∂
∂γ
(
p− α
q − α
)
− (N + 1)p− α
q − α
1
γ
]
<
1
γN+1
[
γ2 + 2γ − 1
(γ + 1)2
κ+
3
(γ + 1)2
− (N + 1)
(
(γ − 1)2
γ(γ + 1)
κ +
2
γ + 1
)]
=
[−Nγ3 + (N + 3)γ2 +Nγ − (N + 1)]κ− γ[2(N + 1)(γ + 1)− 3]
γN+2(γ + 1)2
.
Notice that −Nγ3+(N +3)γ2+Nγ− (N +1) has three zeros: γ1 < 0 < γ2 < 1 < γ3. When
γ ≥ γ3, the last line of (A.14) is negative for all κ > 1. By continuity, there exists γˆ ∈ [1, γ3]
such that when γ ≥ γˆ, the first line of (A.14) is negative, so V (e) given by (9) is increasing
in γ. Notice that γ3 is strictly decreasing in N and converges to 1 as N → ∞. Therefore,
γˆ → 1 as N → ∞. Lastly, we observe that γˆ > 1. By (A.12), p−α
q−α → 1 as γ ↓ 1; by (A.13),
∂
∂γ
(
p−α
q−α
)
→ 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2κ− 1 as γ ↓ 1; therefore, by the first equality in (A.14),
(A.15)
∂
∂γ
[
p− α
q − α
(
q
p
)N+1]
→ 1
2
√
2κ− 1− 1
2
−N
as γ ↓ 1. Hence, for κ > 2N2 + 2N + 1, the right hand side of (A.15) is positive. By
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continuity, there is a small neighborhood to the right of 1 where V (e) is decreasing in γ, so
γˆ > 1.
For the case of N(e) = 0, we compute the following:
∂
∂p
[
p− α
q − α
(
q
p
)N+1]
=
(
q
p
)N+1
1
q − α
[
1 +
p− q
q − α
q
1− 2α − (N + 1)
p− α
p
]
,(A.16)
∂
∂q
[
p− α
q − α
(
q
p
)N+1]
=
(
q
p
)N+1
1
q − α
[
(N + 1)
p− α
q
− p− α
q − α −
p− q
q − α
p
1− 2α
]
.(A.17)
When N = 0, the bracket on the right hand side of (A.16) is positive, and the barcket on
the right hand side of (A.17) is negative. Hence, if N(e) = 0, V (e) is decreasing in p and
increasing in q, so it is decreasing in γ.
We continue to show 3. Notice that the bracket on the right hand side of (A.16) is
increasing in p and decreasing in N . Hence, there exists pˆ ∈ [q, 1 − q] such that (A.16) is
negative when p < pˆ and positive when p > pˆ. Moreover, pˆ is non-decreasing in N . That is,
V (e) is increasing in p when p < pˆ and decreasing in p when p > pˆ. Finally, notice that as
p ↑ 1−q, κ→∞. Hence, by (A.12), p−α
q−α →∞, and V (e)→ 0. Therefore, V (e) is decreasing
in p on a small neighborhood to the left of 1− q, so pˆ < 1− q.
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